It is possible to obtain a large Bayes Factor (BF) favoring the null hypothesis when both the null and alternative hypotheses have low likelihoods, and there are other hypotheses being ignored that are much more strongly supported by the data. As sample sizes become large it becomes increasingly probable that a strong BF favouring a point null against a conventional Bayesian vague alternative co-occurs with a BF favouring various specific alternatives against the null. For any BF threshold q and sample mean X , there is a value n such that sample sizes larger than n guarantee that although the BF comparing H0 against a conventional (vague) alternative exceeds q, nevertheless for some range of hypothetical μ, a BF comparing H0 against μ in that range falls below 1/q. This paper discusses the conditions under which this conundrum occurs and investigates methods for resolving it.
factors may sharply contradict each other regarding the evidentiary status of the null hypothesis. I provide a guide to the conditions under which relying on the Bayes factor to assess the null can mislead researchers and research consumers, and develop practical suggestions for researchers.
Collectively, Bayesians provide diverse advice on how to deal with point null hypotheses for continuous parameters. Some advocate using the Bayes factor, B 01, comparing a null hypothesis H0 against its complement H1 as evidence for or against the null (Dienes, 2014; Konijn, et al. 2015; Rouder, et al. 2018; Wagenmakers, 2007) . The Jeffreys table (Jeffreys, 1961 ) linking adjectives such as "substantial" and "strong" with ranges of BFs has been popular in this connection. Other Bayesians do not endorse BFs for continuous parameters 8, 9, 10 (Gelman, ete al. 2004; Lynch, 2007; Liu & Aitkin, 2008) , with some recommending using credible intervals instead for making decisions about the null (Kruschke, 2011; Bolstad & Curran, 2016) . Still others have pointed out that the Bayes factor and credible interval provide different criteria for assessing the null (Rouder, et al. 2018) , along similar lines to the classic Lindley paper highlighting situations where a strong BF favouring the null co-occurs with a frequentist significance test rejecting it (Lindley, 1957) .
Those in this last camp recommend not using credible intervals to decide whether or not to reject the null.
Setting aside the use of credible intervals, it is easy to forget that the Bayes factor tells us how more or less likely one hypothesis is than another hypothesis, but does not inform us about the absolute likelihoods of either hypothesis. Thus, it is possible to obtain a large BF when both the null and alternative hypotheses have low likelihoods, and there are other hypotheses being ignored that are much more strongly supported by the data.
We shall see that this is what can happen to a pointwise H0 and vague H1 under certain conditions as sample sizes become large. As sample sizes become large it becomes increasingly probable that a strong BF favouring H0 against a conventional Bayesian vague H1 co-occurs with a BF favouring various specific alternatives against H0. Thus, we may simultaneously find strong support for and against the null from the same data. I will call these co-occurrences "Lindley cases", after the so-called Lindley (1957) "paradox".
Lindley cases are most likely to occur when there are small effects and large samples. For a simple example, consider a two-outcome process producing E or ~E on every trial, and let θ denote the proportion of trials yielding E. Let us assume that θ is a binomial variable, setting H0 is 1 2 θ = , H1 is 1 2 θ ≠ , and assigning prior probabilities ( ) ( )
Suppose we observe n trials and k occurrences of E. The likelihood of these data given H0 is
the likelihood of the data given H 1 is
and the Bayes factor for H0 against H1 is
For example, if n = 985 and k = 524 (so the sample proportion is 0.532) then B 01 = 3.344, which in the Jeffreys table lands in the "substantial" range, 3-10, favouring H0. However, if we examine Bayes factors, ( )
, comparing certain point-valued alternatives against the null in the neighbourhood from 0.5 to 2*(524/985) -0.5 = 0.564, we observe that these
Bayes factor greater than 3 against the null. This is a Lindley case. It occurs because both likelihoods for H0 and H1 are relatively small: ( ) 0 | H P k n = 0.003399 and ( ) 1 | H P k n = 0.00101, whereas likelihoods in the neighbourhood from 0.5 to 0.564 are higher than either of these.
Introducing another example, we will now focus on scenarios in which we take a sample of size n from a normal distribution N (μ, σ 2 ) population with known variance σ 2 , testing whether or not the null hypothesis H0 : μ = θ on the mean holds (against the alternative H1 : μ ≠ θ). Without loss of generality, we shall set σ 2 = 1 and we also set θ = 0. The Bayesian framework requires specifying what is meant by H1, and for this we will examine more than one version. The first of these is Robert's (2014) Bayes factor for the null against the alternative when σ 2 = 1:
We can readily confirm the claim by Robert that this equation yields (1.96 16,818 ,16,818) 19 R ≈ in favour of the null. This reproduces the figures from Lindley's (1957) example, where he shows that a t-value of 1.96, sufficient for frequentists to reject the null at α = .05, also yields a BF of 19 favouring the null. A bit of algebra reveals that to achieve a desired Robert BF of q we require
( 1)(log( 1) 2 log( )) n n q X n
Two other versions of H1 considered in this paper are from the JZS-scaled and information-scaled Bayes factors generated by the Rouder et al. (2009) We now move to examining the behaviour of the Bayes factor when the null is compared against a point-valued alternative. A pointwise comparison between two alternatives gives a BF of
The log of this is linear in n and the rate of change in n is positive when 
Given 0 X > , say, for any µ such that 0 < µ < 2X , ( )
Given any criterial threshold, q, from equation (7) we can find the sets of µ satisfying ( )
Moreover, we can use equation (5) to find X to input into equation (7) such that ( ) , R X n q ≥ . We now have the wherewithal to ascertain the conditions under which Lindley cases occur (i.e., combinations of q, n, and X where ( )
We will focus on large samples, because the impact of large samples seems to have been under-explored.
Bayes Factor Example
Suppose n = 5,000, and our BF threshold is q = 3. Then from equation (2) we have
. Suppose also that our BF threshold for q is 3. Inputting n = 5000, q = 3 and 0.035557 X = into equation (7) A measure of evidence related to Bayes factors is the "evidence ratio" (Morey et al., 2016; Wagenmakers, et al. 2019) , which can be written in two ways:
The evidence-ratio compares the conditional probability of θ in the posterior distribution with its probability in the prior. If the same prior is used as the vague "alternative" against which to compute a Bayes factor for a point null, then the evidence-ratio at that point is the Bayes factor. Evidence-ratios greater than 1 favor the hypothetical θ, and taking this idea one step farther yields the concept of a "support interval" (Wagenmakers, et al. 2019) , the values of θ for which ER(θ, x) exceeds some criterial value q. We may also take the analogous step of declaring a "rejection region" as the collection of values of θ for which ER(θ, x) falls below the criterial value 1/q. Thus, support and rejection regions for θ are tantamount to regions displaying the point "nulls" with Bayes factors large or small enough to decide to retain or reject the "nulls".
There also is a straightforward connection between Bayes factors comparing a fixed point null with point-valued alternatives and the evidence-ratios for these alternatives. In equation (8), the denominator of the right-most ratio is a marginal likelihood and therefore a constant that does not involve θ. A BF that compares a point alternative θ against a point-null θ0 may be written as
which therefore is proportional to the evidence-ratio for θ. Their ratio is ( )
the evidence-ratio for θ0. As mentioned above, if the prior involved in ER(θ, x) is the same as the vague alternative employed in a conventional point-null Bayes factor B01, then ER(θ0, Returning to the binomial example earlier in this paper, recall that H0 is 0 1 2 θ = and data are n = 985 and k = 524 so the sample proportion is 0.532. Earlier we ascertained that B 01 = 3.344. If we use the uniform prior then it also is the case that ER(θ0, x) = 3.344, and this is the evidence-ratio-Bayes-factor ratio in equation (10) We can see this by differentiating the second term on the right-hand side of equation (7), which gives ( ) ( X in which the minimum required n is exceeded by the benchmark nb. That will then give us the range of ( ) , R X n for which, given n and q, it also is the case that ( )
least some values of µ around X .
In the example, n = 5000 and q = 3, so inverting equation (5) instance, given a sample of 5000 and JSZ BF between 3 and 20.9126, we know that it will be a Lindley case.
Our next concerns are threefold. First, how does this Lindley case region for ( ) , R X n or the Rouder et al. t-test BFs behave as n increases? Second, for any particular n, how likely is it that even when H0 is true, nonetheless Lindley cases will occur? Third, how does that probability covary with n or q?
Starting with the first concern, equation (11) tells us that as n increases the threshold X will decrease. Substituting the inverted version of equation (11) into equation (4) gives this version of ( )
Differentiating it with respect to n yields ( )
which is positive for ( ) 2 log 1 n q > − . Therefore, although the threshold X declines with increasing n, the upper bound on ( ) , R X n nevertheless increases.
To address the second concern, let us return to our example. We have n = 5000 and q = 3, and inverting equation (5) Regarding the third concern, the probability of observing a Lindley case when H0 is true increases with n. For ( ) , R X n , at n = 10,000 the probability is 0.130 and at n = 20,000 the probability is 0.133, and it is easy to show that it asymptotes at about 0.138. In general, the asymptote is
On the other hand, we can see that it decreases as q increases (e.g., when q = 10 the asymptote is 0.032). Nevertheless, these findings suggest that for values of q regarded by many researchers as "substantial", the probability of Lindley cases is non-negligible even when H 0 is true, and moreover it increases with sample size.
Therefore, point nulls are not "provable" by Bayes factors. Instead, if we want to find the "best bet" on θ then examining ( ) 0 , , B x θ θ (or at least the full range of ER(θ, x)) makes more sense than restricting attention to ER(θ0, x) or the corresponding BF.
Quandary at the Boundary Unfortunately, it is not difficult to show that with large samples support-rejection regions can become problematic in an additional way to Lindley cases. Given a big enough sample, a value arbitrarily close to the point null may be "rejected" by support-interval logic while the point-null will be "supported" at the same criterial ratio. For instance, given a sample size of 6,193 from a Bernoulli random variable, a sample proportion of 0.5156 "rejects" θ = 0.495 and "supports" θ = 0.5 at a criterial evidence-ratio of q = 3.
Returning to our scenario of a normal random variable, for simplicity let us assume a prior distribution for the mean of N(0,1) with a weight that counts it as 1 observation. Then the log of the evidence-ratio for an hypothetical µ is
Given µ = 0, n, and a target log-ratio log(q), the sample mean required to achieve this target
Note that this is very close to the sample mean identified in equation (5) for the target Robert BF (we are using a slightly different prior from his). For example, given µ = 0, n = 5000, and target q = 3, the required sample mean is ± 0.035556.
Symmetry permits us to deal with just the positive mean, so we do so from here on. Given n, target q, and the positive version of the sample mean defined in equation (16), we may solve equation (15) to find the hypothetical means required for the target to be 1/q, which yields ( ) ( ) ( ) log( ) 2 log 2 log ( 2) log 1
( 1)
The left-hand term is the sample mean from equation (16), so the pair of µ in this equation always straddles the sample mean in equation (16). It also is clear that the right-hand term is larger than the left-hand term in equation (17), so the pair of µ also always straddles 0, our null-hypothesis value. Their difference is twice the right-hand term, and as n goes to infinity the right-hand term goes to 0. Thus, the pair of µ may be made arbitrarily close to one another and therefore arbitrarily close to the null that they straddle. That is, we may conclude that for any criterial evidence-ratio level q, it is possible for a hypothetical µ0 to be supported at that level with another µ arbitrarily close to it that is rejected at the same level.
Is a better approach available? The nub of the difficulties revealed in this paper is the use of a point-valued null. If we must make a decision for or against the null, we could a priori select a small range around the null, as in Kruschke's recommendation 12 (Kruschke, 2011 (Kruschke, , 2018 ) a "region of practical equivalence" (ROPE). However, here we put it to a somewhat different use from his. We may use evidence-ratios ER(θ, x) to determine support and rejection regions and ascertain whether these lie within the ROPE. Considerations regarding the width and location of the ROPE are reviewed in Kruschke (2018) .
If a support region containing the null hypothesis θ0 also is entirely contained in a ROPE around the null hypothesis value θ0, then we may conclude in favor of the null. In our Gaussian example, ( ) , 3 ER x µ ≥ when 0 < µ < 0.07111. If prior to obtaining our data we had decided that -0.1 < µ < 0.1 constitutes our ROPE and our threshold is q = 3, then the resulting support region includes 0 and is contained by the interval [-0.1, 0.1], and we therefore could decide in favor of the null. If we want to be more cautious, we could also insist on additional conditions. For instance, we could require that the average ( ) , ER x µ within the ROPE exceed some threshold. Conversely, if one of the rejection regions entirely contains the ROPE then we can reject the null.
Conclusions
It seems wise to take the problems raised here seriously. They demonstrate that, depending on the nature of the alternative being compared to a point-valued null, it is possible for the same data to simultaneously constitute evidence for and against the null. To review the main findings in this paper:
1. For any BF threshold q and sample mean X , there is a value n such that sample sizes larger than n guarantee the occurrence of Lindley cases: Although the BF comparing H0 against a conventional (vague) alternative exceeds q, nevertheless for some range of hypothetical μ, a BF comparing H0 against μ in that range falls below 1/q. 2. For any such X and q, as n increases the BF < 1/q range for μ will expand and the conventional BF also will increase. The evidence for and against the null will become stronger.
3. Although the threshold X moves closer to 0 with increasing n, the upper bound on the conventional BF for which Lindley cases occur nevertheless increases.
4. For any value of q regarded by many researchers as "substantial", the probability of Lindley cases is non-negligible even when H0 is true, and increases with sample size.
5. In a support interval setting, for any level of evidence-ratio, with increasing n it is possible for a point-null µ = 0 to be supported at that level with another µ arbitrarily close to it that is rejected at the same level.
6. Bayes factors comparing a point null against point alternatives are proportional to evidence-ratios for the point alternatives. Therefore, any criterion for determining a support or rejection region will correspond to a decisional criterion for a Bayes factor comparing a point null with a point alternative, and vice-versa.
The sample sizes used here for demonstrations are not outlandish, especially in this age of Big Data. Researchers working with large data-sets are likely to encounter Lindley cases if they find small effects. The results presented here suggest that, on its own, a Bayes factor comparing a point-valued null to a vague alternative may be of little utility in assessing the degree of support for a pointwise null hypothesis, and its utility declines with increasing sample size. They also indicate that using support and rejection regions for deciding whether to reject or confirm a point null can be problematic. Here, the nature of the prior will have an effect. Introducing the use of a ROPE into this decision making process shows some promise, at least for avoiding Lindley cases and some other pitfalls of point-null testing.
These suggestions are not the only ways that the problems raised here can be resolved, and it is beyond the scope of this paper to mount an exhaustive survey of potential resolutions.
Instead, the main point of this paper has been the point out that there is an additional Achilles' heel in the Bayesian framework besides the choice of priors. Bayesian hypothesis testing also is vulnerable to attempting to "prove" a point-valued null, and that vulnerability becomes more apparent with larger samples.
